Gallium: The Semiconductor Material Nobody Talks About Until China Stops Shipping It
September 16, 2026
Altsets
Research by Altsets Research
China's gallium leverage is a qualification and processing chokepoint spanning semiconductor materials, RF, AI data-center power, telecom infrastructure, consumer electronics and defense radar.
Data used:Altsets Supply Chain Intelligence: 90k+ entities, 400k+ relationships, 20+ years of history.
Key findings
- China accounted for 99% of global primary gallium production in 2024 according to the U.S. Geological Survey.
- USGS says about 79% of U.S. gallium consumption takes the form of GaAs, GaN and GaP wafers, while analog and digital integrated circuits account for 74% of gallium consumption by application.
- AXT disclosed that its Chinese subsidiary had generally obtained required export permits for Asia and Europe but no permits for gallium arsenide exports to U.S. customers had yet been approved as of its June 2026 quarterly filing.
- New non-Chinese supply projects at Rio Tinto, Alcoa and METLEN are being attached to existing alumina infrastructure, but announced physical capacity is not equivalent to qualified semiconductor supply.
China's gallium leverage is not primarily a raw-material cost problem. It is a qualification and processing chokepoint that reaches at least 27 listed companies across semiconductor materials, mobile RF, AI data-center power, telecom infrastructure, consumer electronics, and missile-defense radar.
The semiconductor material investors should be watching is gallium. China accounted for 99% of global primary gallium production in 2024, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, an unusually concentrated position even by critical-mineral standards.[1] Since August 2023, Chinese exporters have needed licenses not only for gallium metal but also for gallium nitride, gallium arsenide, gallium oxide and several other gallium compounds, including certain wafers and epitaxial materials.[2]
That distinction matters. A gallium disruption does not have to begin with a chipmaker running out of drums of metal. It can appear one or two manufacturing stages later as an unavailable gallium arsenide wafer, an unlicensed gallium-containing substrate, or a qualified foundry process that cannot easily be moved somewhere else.
As of September 16, 2026, China is not operating a blanket ban on commercial gallium exports to the United States. Beijing's December 2024 rules said gallium-related dual-use exports to the United States would, in principle, not receive licenses, but China suspended that provision in November 2025 through November 27, 2026.[3][4] The original 2023 licensing regime remains in place, however, and the suspension did not eliminate every end-user restriction.
The clearest evidence that this distinction is economically meaningful comes from AXT. The U.S.-listed compound-semiconductor substrate producer manufactures its products in China. In its June 2026 quarterly filing, AXT said its Chinese subsidiary had generally obtained required permits for exports to markets in Asia and Europe, but no permits for gallium arsenide exports to its U.S. customers had yet been approved.[7] Gallium is therefore already an example of a supply chain that can remain technically open while specific commercial pathways stay closed.
Gallium risk is a qualification problem, not a commodity-cost problem
Gallium is unusual because the world is not short of gallium-bearing rock. The metal is generally recovered as a byproduct of processing bauxite for alumina and, to a lesser extent, zinc ores. USGS research notes that this byproduct structure can make supply relatively price-inelastic because an alumina refinery does not simply process vastly more bauxite because gallium prices rise.[6]
The United States currently produces no low-purity primary gallium and relies on imports for domestic demand. USGS says about 79% of U.S. gallium consumption takes the form of gallium arsenide, gallium nitride, and gallium phosphide wafers, while analog and digital integrated circuits account for 74% of gallium consumption by application.[5] That is an important clue for investors: the economically important unit is often the qualified semiconductor material, not a kilogram of gallium metal.
Navitas Semiconductor provides an unusually useful illustration. The company says each of its GaN power ICs contains about 95 micrograms of gallium.[14] METLEN, meanwhile, told the Financial Times this week that European gallium prices were above $3,000 per kilogram.[27] Even at that elevated metal price, the contained gallium value implied by Navitas's disclosure is tiny relative to the value of a finished power semiconductor. Processing losses, purity requirements, epitaxy, wafer fabrication and packaging make the actual economics more complicated, but the direction is clear: the semiconductor industry's principal gallium exposure is not a simple metal-price pass-through.
Skyworks Solutions says it relies on outside foundries to supplement its gallium arsenide wafer manufacturing capacity and that qualifying a replacement foundry typically takes an extended period. The company separately identifies gallium availability and cost as a supply-chain risk.[10] MACOM says high-purity gallium is among the source materials used in its semiconductor production and warns that some alternative sources cannot be adopted quickly because of redesign or qualification requirements.[11] Qorvo manufactures multiple generations of GaAs and GaN technology and uses GaN-on-SiC and GaAs wafers in its operations.[9]
This is why a gallium shock can matter even if the raw commodity is a negligible portion of a device's bill of materials. A shortage does not need to add hundreds of dollars to the cost of a chip. It only needs to interrupt the one approved material, wafer, foundry process, or manufacturing route that produces it.
USGS modeled a complete restriction on Chinese net gallium exports and estimated a $3.1 billion reduction in U.S. GDP in its central case, with a range of $1.7 billion to $8.2 billion.[6] That was a modeled disruption scenario, not a forecast. Still, the result illustrates the unusual economics of the material: a small physical market can gate much larger downstream industries.
Gallium risk moves through a qualification chain
The bottleneck can appear several manufacturing stages after primary metal production.
- 01Primary galliumOften recovered as a byproduct of alumina or zinc processing.
- 02Purification and compoundsSemiconductor-grade gallium, GaAs, GaN and related materials.
- 03Substrates and epitaxyQualified wafers, epi layers and engineered materials.
- 04Foundry and device processRF, optical and power semiconductor manufacturing routes.
- 05High-value systemsPhones, AI power, telecom infrastructure and defense radar.
The article's central point is that physical gallium availability is necessary but not sufficient. Qualification, process transfer and customer approval determine whether downstream production can actually move.
One gallium chain reaches at least 27 listed companies
The public-market exposure does not stop with companies that purchase gallium directly. It runs from alumina refineries into substrate manufacturers, compound-semiconductor fabs, RF components, power electronics and finished systems.
One gallium chain reaches multiple public-market layers
The same material family appears in upstream recovery, qualified semiconductor materials, device manufacturing, foundries and high-value downstream systems.
| Supply-chain layer | Listed companies | What the disclosures establish |
|---|---|---|
| New non-Chinese primary supply | Alcoa, Rio Tinto, METLEN Energy & Metals, Sojitz | Gallium is being added to existing alumina-refining systems in Australia, Canada and Greece. Sojitz is participating in Alcoa's Australian project. [25][26][27] |
| Substrates, epitaxy and engineered materials | AXT, IQE, Coherent | AXT produces purified gallium and GaAs substrates. IQE is qualifying GaAs and GaN materials across AI infrastructure, telecom and defense. Coherent operates GaAs VCSEL facilities and supplies materials used in GaN-on-SiC RF devices. [8][12][13] |
| RF and compound semiconductors | Qorvo, Skyworks Solutions, MACOM, NXP Semiconductors | The companies disclose GaAs or GaN manufacturing, products, wafers or source materials used in mobile RF, telecom, aerospace, defense and other high-frequency applications. [9][10][11][21] |
| GaN power semiconductors | Texas Instruments, Infineon Technologies, STMicroelectronics, Renesas Electronics, ROHM, Navitas Semiconductor | GaN power devices are moving into server power, AI infrastructure, industrial electronics and high-density power conversion. [14][15][17][18][19][20] |
| GaN foundry transition | Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, GlobalFoundries | Navitas identifies TSMC as an existing GaN wafer partner and GlobalFoundries as its U.S.-based GaN fabrication partner. [14] |
| Named downstream systems | Apple, Samsung Electronics, Dell Technologies, Vertiv, Nvidia | Apple and Samsung are major Qorvo RF customers, while Dell and Vertiv have demonstrated server power supplies using TI GaN and TI's 800 VDC architecture for Nvidia includes integrated GaN power stages. [9][15][16] |
| Defense radar | RTX, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman | All three identify GaN in fielded or developing radar systems, including AN/TPY-2, TPY-4 and G/ATOR. [22][23][24] |
The first investable distinction is between companies whose economics sit close to the material and companies that merely sit downstream from it.
AXT is close to the physical chokepoint. Its 2025 revenue was split 67% from semiconductor substrates and 33% from raw materials and other products. One consolidated subsidiary converts raw gallium into purified gallium, which AXT uses internally for GaAs substrates and also sells for the production of GaAs, GaN and other gallium compounds. All of the company's substrate and raw-material products are manufactured in China.[8] A change in export licensing can therefore affect the same company at the raw-material, substrate and customer-delivery levels.
IQE represents a different part of the chain. Its September 2026 interim results describe GaAs-based optical interconnect qualification for AI data centers, GaN-on-Si power epitaxy for AI power supplies, GaN-on-SiC qualification for mobile base stations and GaN RF programs for terrestrial communications, satellites and defense radar.[13] One material family is therefore moving through several end markets that investors often analyze separately.
Coherent adds another branch. The company operates multiple six-inch GaAs VCSEL manufacturing facilities, sells GaAs VCSELs into consumer electronics and data-center applications, and supplies SiC substrates used by customers to manufacture GaN-on-SiC RF power amplifiers for 4G, 5G and 6G base stations.[12] Its filing also warns that some high-purity and uncommon materials have limited qualified sources and can require lengthy transitions if supply changes.[12]
The mobile RF chain is economically important because supplier concentration can transmit a material problem into much larger customer relationships. Qorvo generated roughly 50% of fiscal 2026 revenue from Apple and another 10% from Samsung Electronics, primarily through RF solutions for mobile devices. The same filing says Qorvo manufactures GaAs and GaN technologies and uses GaAs and GaN-on-SiC wafers.[9] That does not prove a particular Apple or Samsung product contains a particular gallium-based Qorvo component. It does show why investors should not stop their supply-chain analysis at the handset brand.
Skyworks presents a similar analytical problem. Apple represented 67% of its fiscal 2025 revenue, while the company separately discloses GaAs manufacturing capacity and gallium procurement risk.[10] A direct material-to-customer mapping would require product-level evidence that the filing does not provide. The correct conclusion is narrower: a gallium disruption can intersect a semiconductor supplier with extreme customer concentration, making qualification and inventory information more relevant than the cost of the raw metal itself.
Gallium-related manufacturing can sit beside concentrated customer exposure
These percentages are company revenue concentration, not gallium-attributable revenue.
AI data centers and missile defense are pulling gallium into higher-value systems
Gallium's next growth vector is increasingly visible in power electronics.
Texas Instruments demonstrated Dell's 1.8 kW server power supply using TI GaN power stages and a 5.5 kW Vertiv server power supply powered by TI GaN technology in 2025.[16] In March 2026, TI unveiled an 800 VDC architecture designed around Nvidia's next-generation AI data-center reference architecture. Its 800 V to 6 V converter uses integrated GaN power stages.[15]
STMicroelectronics introduced 700 V GaN devices in May 2026 for applications including AI servers, robotics and industrial systems.[17] Infineon is incorporating GaN into its data-center power portfolio and its work around Nvidia's AI infrastructure ecosystem.[18] Renesas offers a broad GaN power portfolio spanning infrastructure, industrial, automotive and consumer applications.[19] ROHM said in February 2026 that it would license TSMC's GaN process technology as it builds an internal production system intended to support applications including AI servers and electric vehicles.[20]
Navitas shows why foundry capacity and process transfer matter as much as material access. Its latest annual filing identifies TSMC as an existing GaN wafer fabrication partner and GlobalFoundries as a U.S.-based GaN partner as the company moves toward a multi-foundry model.[14] A company can have ample theoretical access to gallium and still face execution risk if the required wafer process is concentrated at one qualified fab.
The defense pathway is even more direct. Raytheon delivered a fully GaN-populated AN/TPY-2 missile-defense radar in 2025 and describes GaN as increasing radar sensitivity, range and surveillance capacity.[22] Lockheed Martin's TPY-4 air-surveillance radar uses GaN transmitters.[23] Northrop Grumman's AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR is a GaN AESA radar used for air and missile defense, fire control and air-traffic-control missions.[24]
This changes the investment significance of gallium. Data-center power and consumer electronics can potentially redesign around alternative semiconductor technologies over time. Defense programs face different qualification, reliability and performance constraints. A gallium supply shock therefore does not affect every downstream company equally, even if the same chemical element appears somewhere in each chain.
That is also why counting listed companies is more useful than counting end markets. The same upstream supply base feeds businesses whose demand cycles have little correlation with one another: smartphones, AI servers, 5G infrastructure, optical networking, electric vehicles, industrial power electronics, satellite systems and missile-defense radar. A mineral policy decision can create a common supply constraint beneath otherwise unrelated portfolios.
The alternative gallium supply chain is being built inside alumina refineries
The most interesting second-order conclusion is that gallium diversification does not look much like a conventional mining boom.
Because gallium is usually recovered as a byproduct of alumina refining, the most credible new Western supply projects are being attached to existing industrial assets. Rio Tinto is constructing a pilot plant at its Complexe Jonquiere operation in Quebec after successfully extracting gallium from its alumina-refining process. The pilot is expected to operate in 2027. Rio is also considering a demonstration plant capable of producing up to four tonnes per year and says a future commercial operation could reach 40 tonnes annually, equivalent to roughly 5% of current global production.[25]
Alcoa broke ground in August 2026 on a gallium facility at its Wagerup alumina refinery in Western Australia, with participation from Australia, Japan, the United States and Sojitz.[26] METLEN is developing a 50-tonne-per-year gallium operation alongside its Greek bauxite and alumina business. On September 15, 2026, METLEN told the Financial Times that production is scheduled to start in 2027, about a quarter of the planned output has already been sold to an unnamed U.S. technology company, and additional non-European transactions are under discussion.[27]
METLEN also said its production cost is below $300 per kilogram while European market prices are above $3,000 per kilogram.[27] Those numbers should not be treated as a permanent margin forecast. They instead show why China's export controls have changed the investment equation for material that Western alumina refiners historically had little incentive to recover.
New gallium supply is being attached to existing alumina assets
The projects differ in stage and disclosed scale, so announced capacity should not be treated as current qualified semiconductor supply.
| Project | Status in the article | Timing | Disclosed scale |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rio Tinto, Complexe Jonquiere, Quebec | Pilot plant under construction after successful extraction from the alumina-refining process | Pilot expected in 2027 | Pilot plus possible demonstration plant up to 4 t/year; future commercial operation could reach 40 t/year |
| Alcoa, Wagerup, Western Australia | Groundbreaking completed with Australia, Japan, the United States and Sojitz participating | Construction started August 2026 | No production capacity stated in this article |
| METLEN, Greece | Gallium project alongside existing bauxite and alumina operations | Production scheduled to start in 2027 | 50 t/year planned; about one quarter of planned output already sold to an unnamed U.S. technology company |
There is a counter-risk. If non-Chinese refiners invest against today's scarcity economics and Chinese supply later becomes substantially easier or cheaper to obtain, the gallium price premium supporting those projects could compress. That makes long-term offtake contracts, government support, recovery costs and customer qualification at least as important as announced production capacity.
This is why Alcoa, Rio Tinto and METLEN are not immediate substitutes for Chinese gallium in 2026. Rio's pilot is scheduled for 2027. METLEN expects initial production in 2027. Alcoa has only recently started construction. The market is building redundancy, but the qualified alternative supply base still lags the policy risk.
For investors, that creates two very different gallium exposures. The upstream opportunity is attached to existing alumina-processing infrastructure, where gallium can become an additional revenue stream from a material already passing through the plant. The nearer-term supply-chain risk sits farther downstream, where a semiconductor manufacturer may have to qualify a new wafer, substrate, foundry or process before production can move.
What investors should watch next
The first variable is China's licensing behavior, not simply whether a headline says controls have been suspended. The current suspension of the U.S.-specific provision expires on November 27, 2026.[4] No conclusion about what happens after that date is warranted today. AXT's disclosures show why actual permit approvals by product, customer and destination provide more useful information than the headline status of the policy.[7]
The second variable is alternative-source qualification. Skyworks explicitly says replacing foundry capacity takes an extended qualification period.[10] MACOM says unique materials and process technologies can prevent quick substitution.[11] Navitas is actively broadening its GaN foundry network.[14] Investors evaluating gallium exposure should therefore look for changes in second-source qualification, safety stocks, wafer lead times and process-transfer milestones rather than attempting to convert the gallium spot price mechanically into semiconductor gross-margin estimates.
The third variable is whether new Western primary supply becomes commercially qualified rather than merely commissioned. Rio Tinto, Alcoa and METLEN can increase the physical supply of non-Chinese gallium, but semiconductor customers ultimately need the appropriate purity, consistency and downstream processing. A tonne of unqualified metal is not economically interchangeable with a dependable stream of semiconductor-grade wafers.
The fourth variable is where gallium adoption is accelerating while supply diversification is still incomplete. AI data-center power is now creating visible commercial deployments at Texas Instruments, STMicroelectronics, Infineon, Renesas, ROHM and Navitas.[14][15][17][18][19][20] Defense programs at RTX, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman already use GaN in high-value radar platforms.[22][23][24] Those markets can increase the strategic value of reliable non-Chinese supply even if the quantity of gallium inside any individual component remains small.
The concrete conclusion is that gallium should not be analyzed like lithium, copper or another bulk commodity. Its physical market is small, its contained-metal cost can be tiny, and its economic value comes from what it enables. China controls the dominant primary production base and regulates exports at several stages of the gallium value chain. The public-market exposure then branches through substrate companies, compound-semiconductor manufacturers, foundries, server-power suppliers, mobile RF vendors and defense contractors.
If gallium availability tightens again, the companies most worth examining first are not necessarily the largest downstream users and not necessarily the companies with the largest commodity purchases. The more revealing questions are which supplier has a qualified alternative, which wafer process can move, which customer relationship is concentrated, and which new source can actually produce semiconductor-grade material at scale.
That is the central asymmetry in gallium: very little metal can sit underneath a very large amount of revenue.
Methodology and limitations
This article maps gallium exposure using government data, company filings and primary corporate disclosures. The 27 listed companies identified above do not represent the complete gallium supply chain.
A company's use of GaAs or GaN does not establish that every product or customer relationship depends on gallium in the same way. In particular, Qorvo and Skyworks disclose both gallium-related manufacturing and large Apple customer exposure, but their public filings do not provide enough product-level information to attribute a specific portion of Apple revenue to gallium-containing components. Those relationships are therefore treated as economic adjacency rather than proof of product-level dependence.
Announced gallium production capacity is also not equivalent to current qualified supply. Project schedules, recovery yields, purity, customer qualification, financing and commercial offtake can change. The USGS economic-impact estimate cited above is a modeled disruption scenario rather than a forecast of future GDP losses.
No Altsets relationship percentages were used because the supplied Altsets examples do not provide material-specific gallium relationships. Adding unrelated semiconductor relationships would weaken rather than improve the analysis.
For relationship definitions, evidence limits and metric interpretation, see the Altsets methodology.
Sources
-
China: Mineral production statistics and information, U.S. Geological Survey, data available through March 9, 2026. https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/china
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Announcement No. 23 of 2023 on export controls for gallium and germanium-related items, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China and General Administration of Customs, July 3, 2023. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/blgg/art/2023/art_ca2e9d349361441f847bdabac5d8331b.html
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Announcement No. 46 of 2024 on strengthening export controls for relevant dual-use items to the United States, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, December 3, 2024. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zfxxgk/gkml/art/2024/art_99f5d51bbe6a412ca309d5818c4dee52.html
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Gallium Statistics and Information, U.S. Geological Survey, National Minerals Information Center. https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/gallium-statistics-and-information
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AXT Inc. Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2026, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1051627/000143774926027677/axti20260630_10q.htm
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AXT Inc. Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2025, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1051627/000143774926008612/axti20251231_10k.htm
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Qorvo Inc. Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended March 28, 2026, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1604778/000162828026032873/rfmd-20260328.htm
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Skyworks Solutions Inc. Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended October 3, 2025, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, November 7, 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/4127/000000412725000085/swks-20251003.htm
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MACOM Technology Solutions Holdings Inc. Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended October 3, 2025, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, November 14, 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1493594/000149359425000054/mtsi-20251003.htm
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Coherent Corp. Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2026, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/820318/000082031826000020/iivi-20260630.htm
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2026 Interim Results, IQE plc, September 7, 2026. https://www.iqep.com/media/press-releases/2026/2026-interim-results/
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Navitas Semiconductor Corp. Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2025, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1821769/000182176926000007/nvts-20251231.htm
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TI unveils complete 800 VDC power architecture for future generation AI data centers with NVIDIA, Texas Instruments, March 16, 2026. https://www.ti.com/about-ti/newsroom/news-releases/2026/2026-03-16-ti-unveils-complete-800-vdc-power-architecture-for-future-generation-ai-data-centers-with-nvidia.html
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New power management chips from TI maximize protection, density and efficiency for modern data centers, Texas Instruments, March 17, 2025. https://www.ti.com/about-ti/newsroom/news-releases/2025/2025-03-17-new-power-management-chips-from-ti-maximize-protection--density-and-efficiency-for-modern-data-centers.html
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STMicroelectronics' new GaN semiconductors improve energy efficiency for high-demand applications from AI servers to robotics, STMicroelectronics, May 26, 2026. https://newsroom.st.com/media-center/press-item.html/n4776.html
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Infineon joins NVIDIA's MGX AI Factory ecosystem to advance power delivery for AI data centers, Infineon Technologies, 2026. https://www.infineon.com/press-release/2026/infxx202605-092
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Gallium Nitride Power Solutions, Renesas Electronics. https://www.renesas.com/en/key-technologies/gallium-nitride-gan-power-solutions
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ROHM strengthens supply capability for GaN power devices, ROHM Co., February 26, 2026. https://www.rohm.com/news-detail?defaultGroupId=false&news-title=2026-02-26_news_gan
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NXP advances 5G with new gallium nitride fab in Arizona, NXP Semiconductors, September 29, 2020. https://investors.nxp.com/news-releases/news-release-details/nxp-advances-5g-new-gallium-nitride-fab-arizona
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Raytheon delivers 13th AN/TPY-2 radar for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, RTX, May 19, 2025. https://www.rtx.com/news/news-center/2025/05/19/rtxs-raytheon-delivers-13th-an-tpy-2-radar-for-the-u-s-missile-defense-agency
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TPY-4 radar, Lockheed Martin. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/ground-based-air-surveillance-radars/tpy-4.html
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AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task-Oriented Radar, Northrop Grumman. https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/mission-solutions/radars/an-tps-80-ground-air-task-oriented-radar-g-ator
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Rio Tinto advances gallium metal R&D project in partnership with the Government of Canada, Rio Tinto, March 2, 2026. https://www.riotinto.com/can/news/releases/2026/rio-tinto-advances-gallium-metal-rd-project-in-partnership-with-the-government-of-canada
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Australia, Japan, the United States and Alcoa break ground on gallium project in Western Australia, Alcoa, August 24, 2026. https://investors.alcoa.com/press-releases/press-release-details/2026/Australia-Japan-the-United-States-and-Alcoa-Break-Ground-on-Gallium-Project-in-Western-Australia/default.aspx
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Europe risks losing race for key high-tech metal, says FTSE 100 chair, Financial Times, September 15, 2026. https://www.ft.com/content/697fa251-99a3-4043-9f87-ab64e3474d4f
How to Cite This
According to Altsets Supply Chain Intelligence (altsets.com), China accounted for 99% of global primary gallium production in 2024, while gallium exposure downstream is shaped by semiconductor material, wafer, foundry and qualification constraints rather than raw-metal cost alone.
For research inquiries or data access: press@altsets.com
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Sources
- U.S. Geological Survey China mineral statistics
- China Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 23 of 2023
- China Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 46 of 2024
- China Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 72 of 2025
- U.S. Geological Survey gallium statistics
- U.S. Geological Survey gallium export restriction study
- AXT second quarter 2026 Form 10-Q
- AXT 2025 Form 10-K
- Qorvo fiscal 2026 Form 10-K
- Skyworks fiscal 2025 Form 10-K
- MACOM fiscal 2025 Form 10-K
- Coherent fiscal 2026 Form 10-K
- IQE 2026 interim results
- Navitas 2025 Form 10-K
- Texas Instruments 800 VDC AI data-center architecture
- Texas Instruments server power announcement
- STMicroelectronics GaN announcement
- Infineon Nvidia AI infrastructure announcement
- Renesas GaN power solutions
- ROHM GaN supply announcement
- NXP Arizona GaN fab announcement
- RTX Raytheon AN/TPY-2 radar announcement
- Lockheed Martin TPY-4 radar
- Northrop Grumman G/ATOR radar
- Rio Tinto gallium project
- Alcoa Wagerup gallium project
- Financial Times on METLEN gallium project