South Korea Is Looking to Central Asia for Critical Minerals. The Real Opportunity Is Processing.

Central Asia can solve some of Korea's resource problem, not all of it

The September 16 Korea-Central Asia Summit brought together South Korea with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan for the first leaders-level meeting of its kind. The governments agreed to deepen cooperation in critical minerals, energy and industrial supply chains and to establish a recurring ministerial mechanism. South Korea's industry ministry had already convened the first six-country industry ministers meeting two days earlier. [1][8]

The commercial agenda was more specific than the summit language might suggest. Roughly 520 government and business representatives attended the Korea-Central Asia Business Summit, including executives from POSCO, LS Group and Hyundai Motor. Nineteen business cooperation agreements were signed. One directly relevant agreement paired the Korea Institute of Industrial Technology with Kazakhstan's National Center on Complex Processing of Mineral Raw Materials to develop a staged rare-metals supply-chain cooperation model linking Kazakh resources with Korean technology and investment. [9]

That approach fits South Korea's underlying problem. Korea is a major processor and manufacturer but a minor miner. Mining and quarrying excluding coal contributed less than 0.1% of Korean GDP in 2024, while the country remained a major global producer of refined metals and a central manufacturing base for semiconductors, batteries, autos and advanced industrial products. The Korean government therefore identified 33 critical minerals and placed ten under particularly close management: lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese, graphite and five rare-earth elements, cerium, dysprosium, lanthanum, neodymium and terbium. [5]

Its policy objective is diversification rather than self-sufficiency. Seoul's critical-minerals strategy targets reducing dependence on selected supplier countries from around 80% to 50% by 2030. [10]

Central Asia is attractive because its geological strengths are unusually complementary to an economy structured like Korea's. The problem is that geology alone does not determine supply-chain relevance.

A mineral deposit has to be explored, financed, permitted, mined, concentrated, refined to the required purity, converted into a usable industrial material and transported economically to the customer. For rare earths and battery materials in particular, the processing steps are often the real bottleneck.

That is why Korea's summit language repeatedly focused on the entire value chain rather than simply buying ore. President Lee Jae Myung said cooperation should extend from exploration through refining, processing and production. [1]

The mineral map behind Korea's industrial base

The Central Asian opportunity becomes clearer when the region is mapped against Korean companies rather than treated as one generic "critical minerals" theme.

For semiconductors, Uzbekistan may be more strategically interesting than its relatively small mining economy suggests. Tungsten has long been used for semiconductor contacts, vias and conductive structures, while molybdenum is emerging as a potential successor in increasingly narrow interconnect features. Lam Research, for example, has developed molybdenum deposition technology specifically for advanced memory and logic manufacturing as scaling pushes conventional tungsten structures closer to their physical limits. [11]

Uzbekistan already produces molybdenum and is attempting to expand tungsten output. Its government-created Uzbekistan Technological Metals Complex has been tasked with deeper processing of materials including graphite, lithium, magnesium, niobium, tantalum and tungsten. In June 2026, Uzbekistan announced a broader 2026 to 2030 critical-minerals program involving 120 projects with planned investment of $4.2 billion, including new selenium, tellurium and rhenium production and a push to build a complete tungsten and molybdenum chain from raw materials into powders, alloys, rods, wires and industrial parts. [3][12]

Korea has been working on that problem before this week's summit. The Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources met an Uzbek government delegation in June to discuss exploration, resource development, processing technology and joint research involving Uzbekistan's state-backed technological-metals company. A Korea-Uzbekistan rare-metals cooperation program is also developing testing laboratories and production lines aimed at processing tungsten, molybdenum, rhenium, vanadium and other metals. [13]

That is a more consequential model for Samsung Electronics and SK hynix than simply replacing one country that mines tungsten with another. Semiconductor manufacturers need extreme material purity and reliable chemical and metallurgical specifications. The investable question is therefore whether Uzbekistan can become a qualified processed-material source, not whether tungsten exists underground.

Copper creates a similar but much larger-volume opportunity. Korea imported roughly 1.7 million metric tons of copper concentrates in 2024 to feed its domestic refining industry. LS MnM has responded by securing long-term concentrate contracts from Chile and Australia, illustrating how aggressively Korean industry already diversifies raw-material procurement. [5]

Kazakhstan produced about 3.1% of global mined copper in 2024, while Uzbekistan produced approximately 154,000 metric tons of copper contained in concentrate and is expanding processing capacity. Uzbekistan's Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex has been building new processing plants as the country attempts to create a larger domestic copper cluster. [2][3]

That gives Central Asia relevance not only to electrical grids and construction but to semiconductors, batteries, electric motors and the broader electrification complex. Copper is the material that connects nearly every industrial category Korea brought to the summit.

Uranium is the supply chain that already works

The strongest case for Central Asian diversification is not lithium or rare earths. It is uranium.

Kazakhstan accounted for about 39% of global uranium production in 2024, according to the USGS. Uzbekistan produced another 6.6%. [2][3]

This is not theoretical resource potential. Uzbekistan's state uranium producer Navoiyuran already lists Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power as a long-term customer for uranium oxide alongside companies and government buyers from Japan, Canada, France and India. [14]

KHNP has also been deepening its relationship with Kazakhstan. In March 2025 it signed agreements with Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and Kazatomprom's Institute of High Technologies on uranium-resource research. Kazakhstan and South Korea expanded the relationship further during this week's bilateral talks, signing an agreement on peaceful nuclear-energy cooperation alongside discussions on critical minerals. [15][16]

KHNP's procurement behavior shows why that matters. In 2025, the company issued an international tender seeking 4,000 tons of U3O8 for delivery over ten years from 2027 through 2036. [17]

For Korean nuclear exposure, Central Asia therefore offers something batteries do not yet have: large existing production, established exporters, qualified commercial relationships and a direct Korean buyer.

That makes uranium the best benchmark for judging the rest of the summit. A successful Korean critical-minerals strategy in Central Asia should eventually look less like diplomatic access to deposits and more like the uranium market, with long-term contracts, established processing specifications and actual physical flows into Korean industry.

Batteries and autos remain a processing problem

The temptation is to see Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan's lithium prospects and conclude that Korean battery makers have found an alternative supply base. That conclusion is premature.

Korea's battery industry requires a portfolio of materials rather than one mineral. Lithium matters, but so do graphite, nickel, cobalt and manganese. South Korea's own strategic-minerals list reflects this broader chemistry. [5]

Uzbekistan has identified lithium and graphite resources, and Kazakhstan is actively promoting lithium exploration to Korean investors. In February 2025, a Kazakhstan critical-minerals investment seminar in Seoul presented work on the Bakennoye lithium deposit to Korean companies including POSCO International and LX International. [18]

But resource identification is very different from having large volumes of battery-qualified chemicals ready for export. Uzbekistan's existing mineral economy remains much stronger in uranium, copper, molybdenum, gold, rhenium and several industrial metals than in commercial lithium or graphite production. Kazakhstan similarly has significant geological potential without yet representing a major global source of refined battery lithium.

Meanwhile, the processing system Korea is trying to diversify remains highly concentrated. The International Energy Agency reported in its 2026 work on critical minerals that China processes more than 70% of several major energy-transition minerals, including lithium, cobalt, graphite and rare earths. The concentration is even more extreme farther downstream in parts of the battery supply chain. [19]

This is why Central Asia may matter first as a location for new processing capacity rather than as an immediate source of battery feedstock.

The same constraint applies to automobiles. Hyundai Motor has already treated rare-earth supply as a material operating risk. Reuters reported in 2025 that the group had accumulated roughly a year's worth of rare-earth inventory while working to diversify procurement as Chinese export restrictions tightened. [20]

For Hyundai, Kia and Hyundai Mobis, the economically important product is not rare-earth ore. It is the high-performance permanent magnet installed in an electric motor.

That distinction radically narrows the usefulness of simply finding new deposits. The IEA estimates that China accounted for 60% of mined magnet rare earths in 2024, but 91% of refined production and 94% of sintered permanent-magnet manufacturing. [21]

A Kazakh rare-earth deposit therefore does not automatically reduce Hyundai's dependence on the existing magnet ecosystem. The ore would still need to be concentrated, chemically separated into individual rare-earth oxides, refined into metals, alloyed and manufactured into magnets at competitive cost and automotive quality.

South Korea is already trying to solve the downstream portion elsewhere. POSCO International has signed long-term contracts to supply non-Chinese rare-earth permanent magnets to automakers in North America and Europe and has continued expanding its critical-minerals strategy into lithium and rare earth projects globally. [22]

Central Asia could eventually become another feedstock leg in that network. It is unlikely to become a complete replacement magnet chain quickly.

The less obvious opportunity is industrial metals

Focusing exclusively on EV batteries would also miss some of Central Asia's more mature mineral advantages.

Kazakhstan is a substantial producer of chromite, titanium sponge, zinc, copper, molybdenum, magnesium and several other materials alongside uranium. Uzbekistan has significant copper and molybdenum output and produces rhenium, tellurium and indium. Tajikistan accounted for an estimated 18% of global antimony production in 2024, ranking second worldwide. [2][3][4]

These materials feed broader industrial markets including specialty steels, metalworking, electronics, catalysts, aerospace components, electrical equipment and chemical applications. Their end markets are less visible than lithium-ion batteries but often have fewer substitute suppliers.

Tajik antimony is a useful example of the second-order opportunity. The country exported all of its antimony ore and concentrate to China in 2024, even though processed antimony products went to other markets. [4]

If Korean or allied processing capacity eventually buys Central Asian ore directly, diversification could alter not merely where a mineral is mined but which refining ecosystem captures it.

This is the deeper economic contest running through the summit. Central Asian governments do not want to remain exporters of unprocessed rock. Korea does not gain much resilience if a Central Asian mine sends its output to China for refining before the material arrives in Korea.

Both sides therefore have an incentive to build intermediate processing capacity inside Central Asia or Korea.

That is also where Korean industrial companies may have an advantage over pure financial investors. POSCO brings refining and materials experience. LS Group brings copper and electrical manufacturing. Korea Zinc operates complex nonferrous-metal recovery and refining systems. Korean engineering and construction companies can participate in the concentrators, smelters, power systems and transport infrastructure required before a mineral project becomes a dependable industrial supplier.

What investors should watch after the summit

The first test is whether memorandums turn into offtake contracts. Government cooperation is useful for exploration rights and financing, but a Korean manufacturer signing a multi-year purchase agreement is stronger evidence that a project has moved from diplomacy into the supply chain.

The second is processing location. A new mine is much less strategically valuable to Korea if its concentrate still depends on Chinese separation or refining. Projects that include hydrometallurgy, chemical conversion, metal refining or precursor production deserve more attention than projects that stop at ore extraction.

The third is mineral-specific economics. Uranium already has global buyers and functioning Central Asian production. Copper has large existing operations and deep markets. Uzbekistan's tungsten and molybdenum programs have a plausible industrial base. Lithium and rare earth deposits require more skepticism until reserve quality, recovery rates, capital costs and downstream processing routes are demonstrated.

The fourth is logistics. Central Asia is landlocked, which means diversification creates a transportation problem alongside a mining solution. Kazakhstan is investing heavily in the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor, including rail and port infrastructure, but the World Bank and EBRD continue to identify capacity and operational bottlenecks. In February 2026, the World Bank approved an $846 million guarantee designed to mobilize $1.41 billion for improvements to Kazakhstan's section of the corridor. [23]

That creates a second-order investment implication. If mineral production expands, railways, Caspian ports, power infrastructure, processing plants and industrial equipment could receive capital before the underlying minerals become economically significant to Korean manufacturers.

Finally, investors should distinguish supply security from cheap supply. Korean companies may accept higher costs for a qualified second source if it reduces the probability that one export restriction can interrupt production. But diversification projects still have to survive commodity cycles. A mine that only works when geopolitical risk drives prices sharply higher is not necessarily a durable alternative supplier.

Conclusion

South Korea's Central Asia strategy is best understood as an attempt to build several new industrial corridors rather than one replacement for China.

The strongest corridor already exists in nuclear fuel. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are major uranium producers, and KHNP already buys Uzbek uranium while expanding cooperation with Kazakhstan.

A second corridor is emerging around tungsten, molybdenum, copper and other industrial metals, particularly in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. These materials match the needs of Korean semiconductor, electrical and advanced-manufacturing companies, and the region already has some commercial production and processing infrastructure.

The battery and automotive opportunity is larger in theory but further away. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan may eventually contribute lithium, graphite and rare-earth feedstocks, but deposits alone do not solve Korea's dependence on concentrated refining, chemical processing and permanent-magnet manufacturing.

That makes the summit's most important phrase "value chain," not "critical minerals."

For investors, the companies and projects worth following will be the ones that connect Central Asian geology to qualified industrial output: uranium contracts for KHNP, tungsten and molybdenum processing that can serve semiconductor supply chains, copper projects linked to Korean refiners, rare-earth separation and magnet capacity, and the logistics infrastructure required to move those materials without simply routing them back through the supply chain Korea is trying to diversify away from.

Sources

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