The HBM Supply Chain Below SK hynix and Samsung

September 16, 2026

Altsets

Research by Altsets Research

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HBM4 growth is creating a different kind of exposure below the memory leaders: smaller equipment and materials suppliers can depend heavily on SK hynix or Samsung even when those customers have far less economic dependence on them.

Data used:Altsets Supply Chain Intelligence: 90k+ entities, 400k+ relationships, 20+ years of history.

Key findings

  • Hanmi Semiconductor disclosed a 44.2 billion won HBM4 equipment order from SK hynix equal to 7.66% of Hanmi's 2025 revenue.
  • Altsets maps Samsung Electronics as 2.43% of Shin-Etsu Chemical revenue while Shin-Etsu represents 0.29% of Samsung COGS.
  • The Samsung and Shin-Etsu relationship illustrates economic asymmetry without proving that the relationship is HBM-specific or technically irreplaceable.
  • Supplier-side financial materiality can be much larger than the same supplier's share of a memory manufacturer's consolidated cost base.

HBM is becoming a bigger business for SK hynix and Samsung, but the more asymmetric investment exposure can sit one layer below them. As both companies expand HBM4 production, equipment and materials suppliers can receive orders worth a meaningful share of their annual revenue while representing only a small piece of the memory manufacturers' overall cost base. Hanmi Semiconductor provides a direct HBM4 example at SK hynix, while Altsets data shows the same economic pattern in Samsung's broader semiconductor supply chain through Shin-Etsu Chemical.

The timing matters because HBM4 has moved from qualification into production. SK hynix said it began mass shipments of HBM4 during the second quarter of 2026 and plans to ramp production through the second half of the year. [1] Samsung began commercial HBM4 shipments earlier in 2026 and said it expects its HBM revenue to more than triple this year compared with 2025 as it expands HBM4 capacity. [2]

That growth creates an important distinction for investors. SK hynix and Samsung may spend billions expanding memory production, but a relatively modest purchase for either company can represent a major revenue event for a specialized supplier.

The investment signal is asymmetry: a specialized supplier can experience a major revenue event from spending that remains small relative to a memory manufacturer's total economics.

KRW 44.2B
Hanmi HBM4 equipment order from SK hynix
June 2026 Korea Exchange disclosure
7.66%
Order value as a share of Hanmi Semiconductor 2025 revenue
One disclosed HBM4 equipment contract
2.43%
Samsung share of Shin-Etsu revenue
Altsets Supplier Revenue %
0.29%
Shin-Etsu share of Samsung COGS
Altsets Customer Cost %
More than 8x
Directional economic asymmetry in the Samsung and Shin-Etsu relationship
2.43% Supplier Revenue % compared with 0.29% Customer Cost %
More than 3x
Samsung expected 2026 HBM revenue versus 2025
Samsung company guidance cited in source [2]

HBM4 turns memory capex into supplier concentration

Hanmi Semiconductor is the clearest current example.

In June, Hanmi disclosed a 44.2 billion won order from SK hynix for its TC BONDER 4.5 GRIFFIN equipment specifically for HBM4 manufacturing. The contract alone was equal to 7.66% of Hanmi's entire 2025 revenue. [3]

That is the kind of number that gets obscured when HBM analysis stops at the memory manufacturer.

Thermo-compression bonding is part of the process used to build vertically stacked HBM packages. For SK hynix, buying another group of bonders is one component of a much larger production system. For Hanmi, a single HBM4 equipment order can equal nearly one-twelfth of the previous year's revenue.

Exhibit 1

One HBM4 order can be large relative to a specialist supplier

The June 2026 Hanmi Semiconductor contract provides a direct measure of supplier-side materiality.

  1. 01
    SK hynix HBM4 ramp
    HBM4 moved into mass shipments in 2026
  2. 02
    TC bonding equipment
    Specialized equipment used in stacked HBM packaging
  3. 03
    Hanmi Semiconductor
    KRW 44.2B TC BONDER 4.5 GRIFFIN order
  4. 04
    Supplier-side materiality
    Order equals 7.66% of Hanmi 2025 revenue

The 7.66% figure is the disclosed order value divided by Hanmi Semiconductor's 2025 revenue. It does not measure SK hynix Customer Cost %, technical irreplaceability, or total HBM4 equipment spending.

Source: Altsets presentation of the Hanmi Semiconductor Korea Exchange disclosure cited in source [3]

The relationship therefore has a different economic meaning depending on which side an investor owns.

Hanmi's exposure can rise sharply when SK hynix accelerates HBM capacity. The reverse conclusion does not automatically follow. The public contract disclosure tells us how material this particular order is to Hanmi, but it does not provide an Altsets Customer Cost % for the Hanmi to SK hynix relationship. It would therefore be wrong to turn the 7.66% figure into a claim about SK hynix's cost dependence or Hanmi's technical irreplaceability.

What it does establish is operating leverage to customer spending. A comparatively small change in SK hynix's equipment purchasing can translate into a much larger change in the revenue opportunity available to a specialized supplier.

That is the first layer investors should look for below HBM.

Samsung shows the same asymmetry at the materials layer

The pattern is not limited to packaging equipment.

Altsets maps Shin-Etsu Chemical as a supplier to Samsung Electronics. Samsung represents 2.43% of Shin-Etsu's revenue, while Shin-Etsu represents just 0.29% of Samsung's COGS.

Those metrics measure different sides of the same relationship. Supplier Revenue % measures Samsung's importance to Shin-Etsu's revenue. Customer Cost % measures Shin-Etsu's importance within Samsung's cost base.

The resulting asymmetry is substantial. Samsung's economic importance to Shin-Etsu is more than eight times Shin-Etsu's measured share of Samsung's COGS.

Exhibit 2

The Samsung and Shin-Etsu relationship is much larger from the supplier's perspective

Two Altsets metrics describe opposite sides of the same company-level relationship.

Relationship viewMetricValueWhat it measures
Samsung importance to Shin-EtsuSupplier Revenue %2.43%Samsung's estimated share of Shin-Etsu revenue
Shin-Etsu importance to SamsungCustomer Cost %0.29%Shin-Etsu's estimated share of Samsung COGS

These percentages have different denominators and should not be added together. Supplier Revenue % measures customer importance to the supplier. Customer Cost % measures supplier importance to the customer's COGS.

Source: Altsets

This does not mean 2.43% of Shin-Etsu's revenue comes from HBM. Altsets relationships are company-level relationships, and Samsung operates businesses far beyond HBM. It also does not prove that Samsung could easily replace Shin-Etsu. Technical qualification and economic dependence are separate questions.

But the relationship illustrates why the HBM supply chain should not be analyzed only by searching for the component with the largest cost share.

A supplier can be strategically relevant to semiconductor manufacturing while remaining almost immaterial to the customer's consolidated cost structure. At the same time, the customer can be meaningful enough to the supplier that changes in purchasing, qualification, capacity plans, or technology transitions matter disproportionately to the supplier's financial results.

HBM4 can intensify exactly this type of asymmetry.

As SK hynix and Samsung move toward more advanced DRAM processes, higher stack counts, tighter packaging tolerances, and eventually newer bonding architectures, they create demand across front-end equipment, materials, inspection, bonding, and packaging. Yet the memory producers are enormous diversified buyers. Many companies selling into those expansions are not.

That makes customer concentration one of the more useful ways to search for second-order HBM exposure.

An HBM supplier whose sales rise by hundreds of millions of dollars may barely change Samsung's or SK hynix's total manufacturing economics. The same spending can transform the revenue mix of a smaller equipment company.

For Altsets metric definitions and interpretation limits, see the research methodology.

The investment signal is asymmetry, not simply scarcity

The most interesting companies below SK hynix and Samsung are therefore not necessarily the suppliers with the largest absolute contracts.

They are companies for which HBM-related purchasing is large relative to the supplier's own revenue base.

Hanmi's June HBM4 order is unusually clean evidence because the contract is explicitly tied to HBM4 and immediately represents 7.66% of prior-year revenue. Shin-Etsu provides a broader company-level example of the same structure: Samsung is materially more important to the supplier's revenue than the supplier is to Samsung's costs.

Those are different relationships, and neither proves technical dependence. But both point to the same investment mechanism.

Exhibit 3

A practical screen for second-order HBM exposure

The article separates HBM relevance from supplier-side financial materiality.

  1. 01
    HBM capacity expands
    SK hynix or Samsung increases advanced memory production
  2. 02
    Specialist supplier wins demand
    Equipment, materials, inspection, bonding, or packaging
  3. 03
    Measure supplier dependence
    Contract value or Supplier Revenue % relative to supplier scale
  4. 04
    Keep customer dependence separate
    Customer Cost % and technical qualification answer different questions

This is an analytical sequence, not a complete HBM supply chain and not a stock-return model.

Source: Altsets

When HBM capacity expands, the percentage change in economic exposure can be much larger below the memory manufacturer than at the memory manufacturer itself.

For investors searching beyond SK hynix and Samsung, that is the part of the HBM supply chain worth measuring: not simply who supplies HBM production, but whose financial results can become unusually dependent on the companies producing it.

Conclusion

HBM4 is turning SK hynix and Samsung into increasingly important demand centers for specialized semiconductor suppliers. The more asymmetric exposure can sit downstream from their capital budgets: Hanmi received a single HBM4 equipment order equal to 7.66% of annual revenue, while Altsets shows Samsung accounting for 2.43% of Shin-Etsu revenue even though Shin-Etsu represents only 0.29% of Samsung COGS.

The key distinction is economic dependence. A supplier does not have to be a large cost item for SK hynix or Samsung to have significant exposure to their HBM expansion. In many cases, that imbalance is precisely what makes the second layer of the HBM supply chain more sensitive to the cycle than the giants at the center of it.

Sources

  1. "SK hynix Announces 2Q26 Financial Results," SK hynix Newsroom, August 2026. https://news.skhynix.com/en/q2-2026-business-results/
  2. "Samsung Ships Industry-First Commercial HBM4 With Ultimate Performance for AI Computing," Samsung Global Newsroom, February 12, 2026. https://news.samsung.com/global/samsung-ships-industry-first-commercial-hbm4-with-ultimate-performance-for-ai-computing
  3. "HBM4 manufacturing TC BONDER 4.5 GRIFFIN equipment order," Korea Exchange disclosure by Hanmi Semiconductor, June 8, 2026. https://kind.krx.co.kr/external/2026/06/08/000436/20260520000503/91370.htm

How to Cite This

According to Altsets Supply Chain Intelligence (altsets.com), Samsung represents 2.43% of Shin-Etsu Chemical revenue while Shin-Etsu represents 0.29% of Samsung COGS. Separately, Hanmi Semiconductor disclosed an HBM4 equipment order from SK hynix equal to 7.66% of Hanmi's 2025 revenue.

For research inquiries or data access: press@altsets.com

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Methodology

Read the methodology for this research.